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Abstract 
Laboratory-based studies of problem solving suggest that transfer of solution 
principles from an analogue to a target arises only minimally without the 
presence of directive hints. Recently, however, real-world studies indicate that 
experts frequently and spontaneously use analogies in domain-based problem 
solving. There is also some evidence that in certain circumstances domain 
novices can draw analogies designed to illustrate arguments. It is less clear, 
however, whether domain novices can invoke analogies in the sophisticated 
manner of experts to enable them to progress problem solving. In the current 
study groups of novices and experts tackled large-scale management 
problems. Spontaneous analogising was observed in both conditions, with no 
marked differences between expertise levels in the frequency, structure or 
function of analogising. On average four analogies were generated by groups 
per hour, with significantly more relational mappings between analogue and 
target being produced than superficial object-and-attribute mappings. 
Analogising served two different purposes: problem solving (dominated by 
relational mappings), and illustration (which for novices was dominated by 
object-and-attribute mappings). Overall, our novices showed a sophistication 
in domain-based analogical reasoning that is usually only observed with 
experts, in addition to a sensitivity to the pragmatics of analogy use. 
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The Structure and Function of Spontaneous Analogising in Domain-Based 
Problem Solving 
Theorists have traditionally viewed analogical reasoning as a core 
element of intelligent thought (Raven, 1938; Sternberg, 1977), and recent 
evidence suggests that it may play a central role in the retrieval of information 
from long-term memory (e.g., Schank, 1999), in domain-based skill 
acquisition (Anderson, 1983), and in creative problem solving (e.g., Holyoak 
& Thagard, 1995). It is this latter area of activity that forms the focus of the 
present research. In problem-solving contexts analogical reasoning is typically 
viewed as entailing the use of “base” information from a previous problem-
solving episode to facilitate attempts at solving a current “target” problem. It 
is noteworthy, however, that the postulated importance of analogising in 
problem solving stands in sharp contrast to many findings concerning the 
nature and extent of analogical problem solving in laboratory studies. For 
example, pioneering experiments by Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983) 
demonstrated that providing participants with a base analogue prior to them 
tackling a superficially different but conceptually similar target promoted only 
a modest increase in solution rates (i.e., to levels of 20-30%) relative to a 
control condition where no analogue had been presented. It was only in 
conditions where explicit hints were provided about the relevance of the base 
information to the target problem that high levels of facilitated performance 
arose (see also Anoli, Antonietti, Crisafulli, & Cantoia, 2001). 
Other studies have clarified that the transfer of an analogous solution 
in the absence of directive hints is also not greatly elevated by manipulations 
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such as: (a) giving participants a static diagrammatic representation of the 
underlying solution-structure associated with the base problem (e.g., Gick & 
Holyoak, 1983; Pedone, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2001); (b) providing problem 
solvers with an abstract verbal statement summarising the underlying 
conceptual nature of the base problem and its solution (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 
1983); or (c) re-presenting the base information to the participant whilst they 
are processing the target (Anoli et al., 2001; Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Taken 
together, this evidence appears to support the contention that whilst people 
may be good at utilising prior problem and solution information when they are 
directed to do so, they may be rather limited in their capacity to detect such 
analogous information in the first place. 
Evidence for Spontaneous Analogising 
Some studies, however, have produced more striking evidence for the 
spontaneous use of analogies by problem solvers. For example, Pedone et al. 
(2001, Experiments 3 and 4) demonstrated the effectiveness of animated 
displays of base analogues for spontaneous transfer. In addition, Holyoak and 
Koh (1987) and Keane (1987) have shown that people do notice and apply 
prior analogues when there are high levels of surface similarity in the 
information content of the base and target, in addition to underlying 
conceptual similarity. This latter situation arguably relates more closely to 
much real-world problem solving, where “within-domain” analogies involving 
close variants of a target problem are likely to be available. For example, Ball, 
Ormerod, and Morley (2004) illustrate the role of within-domain analogising 
in professional design practice with reference to an industrial designer who, 
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when tackling an information-display problem, was readily able to bring to 
mind previous design experience relating to other displays that he had worked 
on in the past.  
At a theoretical level, Sweller (1980) has argued that much of the time 
there is, in fact, a strong correlation between the surface features of problems 
and their underlying abstract solution structures. Therefore, relying on surface 
features to access what might be a relevant base problem may be a valuable 
heuristic (cf. Blessing & Ross, 1996), and one that the human cognitive 
system may well have evolved to operate. As a heuristic, however, it is likely 
to be far from foolproof, and may, on occasions, lead to attempts to map 
between base and target problems that, whilst appearing to be superficially 
similar at a surface level, in fact have no underlying conceptual association in 
terms of solution structures (e.g., see Novick, 1988, for relevant evidence). 
Apart from the role of surface similarity in driving spontaneous 
analogical reasoning, other research has provided evidence for unprompted 
analogising when multiple analogues are presented prior to the target problem 
-- even when such analogues share few surface similarities to the target (see 
Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Catrombone, & Holyoak, 1989). This line of research 
is particularly interesting as it suggests that a primary mechanism 
underpinning the development of domain-based expertise may well be 
analogical reasoning. The essential claim of theorists taking this position (e.g., 
Anderson, 1983; Blessing & Ross, 1996; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Schank, 
1999) is that repeated exposure to within-domain problems serves to promote 
the induction of generalised knowledge schemas. Such schemas embody an 
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abstract conceptual understanding of the underlying structure of problems, and 
serve to enable the recognition of problem “types”; they also embody a 
procedural understanding of how best to solve problems of that particular 
type. 
 Analogical Problem Solving in Real-World Contexts 
Recently, spontaneous analogical problem solving has started to be 
investigated in applied contexts. This research has particularly focused on the 
behaviour of experts. For example, Marchant, Robinson, Anderson, and 
Schadewald (1993) investigated the use of analogies in the interpretation of 
tax statutes in graduate students and professional lawyers. They found that 
both groups demonstrated high rates of transfer from domain-based structural 
analogues. Likewise, Clement (1988) found that science experts frequently 
evoked analogies when attempting to explain a concept. Most recently, 
Dunbar and colleagues (e.g., Dunbar, 2001; Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001) have 
documented the use of analogy by immunologists and molecular biologists, 
finding that structural analogising was prevalent in a range of scientific 
activities, such as formulating hypotheses, designing and modifying 
experiments, and giving explanations to other scientists. Dunbar (2001) was 
also able to determine the function of the analogies in his observations. When 
isolated, unexpected results occurred the scientists drew analogies to similar 
experiments, what Dunbar (2001) calls “local” analogies. However, when a 
series of unexpected results occurred the scientists drew more distant 
analogies to the function of similar components in other organisms. Thus the 
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type of analogical mapping appears to differ depending on the purpose for 
which it is drawn.  
 In sum, it appears that experts in applied settings are able 
spontaneously to draw analogies between base and target problems. This is 
consistent with the widely held view that key differences between experts and 
novices reflect different levels of information encoding. Experts are able to 
encode information at a deeper, structural level, whilst novices generally 
encode information at a more surface or superficial level (Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981; Klein, 1999; Novick, 1988). In this way, experts solving 
domain-based problems are able to exploit the underlying relational structure 
of information much better than novices, who generally rely more on the 
superficial features of problem situations (Chi et al., 1981; Klein, 1998; 
Novick, 1988). This account of expert problem solving is also consistent with 
the findings of Thompson, Gentner, and Loewenstein (2000), who observed 
that unless management students were actively encouraged to compare base 
analogues in order to draw out their structural relations, their rate of transfer 
of an underlying concept remained low.  
 In contrast to Thompson et al.’s (2000) findings, however, there is 
some evidence that novices, like experts, can readily make use of structural 
analogies without being directly encouraged to create such structural 
mappings. For example, Blanchette and Dunbar (2000) asked novices to 
engage in political analysis and generate base analogues to explain a target 
concept to others. It was found that these novices were readily able to draw 
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structural inferences from the target domain to semantically distant source 
domains that also possessed little superficial similarity to the target problem. 
 Overall, then, the extent to which domain novices are able to draw on 
analogies when tackling problems remains unclear, with the few existing 
studies showing some inconsistent findings that may well relate to 
methodological aspects of the research – a point that is argued persuasively  
by Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000. For example, their own study that reveals 
good levels of structural analogising in novices adopts what they refer to as a 
production paradigm, whereby participants are given a target problem and 
asked to generate a source analogue. This contrasts with the lower levels of 
novice analogising in Thompson et al.’s (2000) study and most traditional 
laboratory-based research, which adopt what they term a reception paradigm, 
whereby participants have to detect a relation between source and target 
problems that are presented.  
 Our present study, then, was designed as an attempt to address further 
the issue of spontaneous analogising in real-world novice and expert problem 
solving. Our chosen domain was management science, which allows 
practitioners to draw widely on multiple sources of stored knowledge to affect 
solutions to problems. Our study investigated both management novices 
(undergraduates) and management experts (postdoctoral academics) 
conducting group-based analyses of a presented “business case” (Easton, 
1992). Participants worked in teams and were required to specify the problems 
and opportunities inherent in the case, and to produce a set of solutions that 
might optimise the success of the business described in the case. The task may 
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be described as ill-defined (Van Lehn, 1989) and, in some respects, undefined, 
as multiple solution possibilities exist, and there is no objective metric for 
judging attainment of an optimal solution.  
 Our study involved comparisons between the frequency and 
structural complexity of analogising in expert and novice management 
practitioners. In light of observations concerning the differing functions of 
analogies in real-world situations, we were also alert to the possibility that 
management contexts might similarly be associated with analogy use aimed at 
attaining different practical goals. To achieve our aims, analogies first needed 
to be identified in the transcribed discussions of collaborating participants, and 
then had to be categorised using a pre-defined coding scheme. The 
identification of analogies was based on a technique developed by Clement 
(1988), and will be considered in more detail in the method section below. 
The coding of analogies derived from a scheme developed by Gentner (1983) 
for classifying the syntactic elements of information that are mapped between 
base and target domains (see also Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989), 
and is described below. 
The Structure of Analogies 
 Like Gentner, we also view domains as being systems of objects, 
object-attributes and relations between objects. As such, domain knowledge 
can be understood as comprising propositional networks of nodes and 
predicates (e.g., Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977), where 
nodes represent concepts, and where predicates are applied to nodes to express 
propositions about concepts. One critical syntactic distinction among predicate 
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types advanced by Gentner (1983) is that between object-attributes versus 
relations. This distinction can readily be made explicit in the predicate 
structure. Thus object-attributes are simply predicates that take on a single 
argument of the form, PREDICATE (argument1), as in the following example 
that describes the colour of an object or entity1: BROWN (Hercules-the-dog). 
In contrast, relations are predicates that take on two or more arguments of the 
form PREDICATE (argument1, argument 2…argumentn), as in the following 
example: CHASE (Hercules-the-dog, Fifi-the-dog).  
Under this distinction between attributes and relations, base-to-target 
mappings could arise at: (a) just the level of attributes and associated objects; 
(b) just the level of relations; or (c) a mix of both levels. Gentner (1983), 
however, argues that type-a and type-c mappings are best viewed as being 
mere appearance matches and literal similarities, respectively, rather than 
examples of “pure” analogies (see also Gentner & Markman, 1997). She 
reserves the term “analogy” for situations where there are few or no object-
and-attribute mappings between base and target domains relative to many 
relational mappings, as in type-b. Our own research on spontaneous 
analogising in real-world practice (Ball et al., 2004; Bearman, 2004) suggests 
that few cases of analogising reach the status of being exclusively relational in 
nature. Thus our coding scheme simply aimed to dichotomise instances of 
analogising that were either purely object-and-attribute level mappings (i.e., 
mere appearance matches) versus those that involved relational mappings 
(irrespective of whether or not object-and-attribute mappings were also 
occurring). Henceforth we refer to the former category of analogising as 
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object-and-attribute analogies, and the second category as relational 
analogies. 
A second syntactic distinction advanced by Gentner (1983) is that 
between first-order predicates (that take objects as arguments) and higher-
order predicates (that take propositions as arguments). For example, CHASE 
(Hercules-the-dog, Fifi-the-dog) and RUN-AWAY-FROM (Fifi-the-dog, 
Fifi’s-owner) are both first-order predicates, whereas CAUSE [CHASE 
(Hercules-the-dog, Fifi-the-dog), RUNS-AWAY-FROM (Fifi-the-dog, Fifi’s-
owner)] is a second-order predicate2. It is clear that the order of a mapping has 
a very close association to the level of the entities that are mapped (as 
described previously) with the pure object-and-attribute mappings discussed 
above being lower-order predicate mappings in contrast to mappings of 
relations and systems of relations, which encompass higher-order predicate 
mappings. This observation allowed us to finesse the distinction between 
mapping level and mapping order for the purpose of our primary analysis of 
analogy structure. Thus, we simply utilised the single coding scheme already 
described (i.e., identifying object-and-attribute analogies vs. relational 
analogies) in order to capture salient aspects of the structure of analogising 
arising in the problem solving of our novice and expert participants. The fact 
that our relational category encompassed both first-order predicate mappings 
as well as higher-order predicate mappings seems warranted on theoretical 
grounds, given that such analogies are clearly distinct in a syntactically 
significant way from pure object-and-attribute analogies that simply reflect 
mere appearance matches in Gentner’s (1983) terminology. 
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The Function of the Analogies 
The structure-oriented coding scheme that we have just outlined was 
unable to address issues relating to the purpose or goal for which analogies 
might be drawn in our study. The pragmatic analysis of analogical transfer 
was pioneered by Holyoak (1985), and since this time pragmatics have been 
found to constrain how ambiguity is resolved (e.g., Spellman & Holyoak, 
1996) and to influence the semantic distance between base and target domains 
(e.g., Dunbar, 2001; Richland, Holyoak, & Stigler, 2004). It may well be, 
then, that the reason why the novices and experts draw analogies will 
influence the form that the analogy takes, and we were alert to this issue in the 
present study. 
To capture the function of analogies it our research it was necessary to 
use a second method of coding that was able to discriminate such nuances in 
analogy use. Since it was considered desirable to allow the functional aspects 
of analogies to emerge from the data rather than to pre-judge the issue, a 
qualitative assessment of expert and novice analogising was performed on the 
data in the form of a thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is a method of 
classifying segments of discourse that involves sorting such extracts on the 
basis of perceived similarities (Plummer, 1995; Smith, 1995). 
Method  
Participants 
 
Sixty-four participants took part in the study. Thirty-two participants 
were undergraduates (23 female; 9 male), and are henceforth referred to as 
novices. Thirty-two participants were postdoctoral academics employed in 
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management science at various universities around the world (11 females; 21 
male), and are henceforth described as experts. Participants were not paid.  The 
novices were analysing cases of business situations as part of their course 
requirements for a final-year marketing module within their management 
science degree course. We acknowledge that our novices were not totally 
naïve to the area of business management as they possessed some relevant 
domain knowledge. Still, they were very inexperienced in tackling business-
case problems, and the relevant knowledge that they did posses was mainly in 
the form of analytical concepts such as the use of SWOT analysis for 
considering a company’s current position. The experts we studied were 
analysing cases as a part of workshops that they were involved in on the theme 
of “Teaching with Cases”. These experts were all post-doctoral academics 
employed in management schools within universities, and thus had a wealth of 
advanced domain knowledge. Several of had been practicing management for 
more than ten years, and thus surpassed the threshold that some researchers 
have claimed as a criterion for true expertise, though most fell short of this 
ten-year threshold by a few years. All of our participants, whether novices or 
experts, worked in collaborating groups during their case analyses. 
Materials 
There were eight novice groups that each involved four participants. 
Four cases were distributed equally amongst these eight novice groups (i.e., 
each case was initially analysed by two different groups). Groups 1 and 2 
analysed “Ballygowan Springs into New Age Kisqua” (Cullen, 1996), Groups 
3 and 4 analysed “The Champagne Industry in 1993” (Cool, Howe, & 
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Henderson, 1998), Groups 5 and 6 analysed “Petrol Retailing in Europe: The 
UK Market” (Lew, 1999), and Group 7 and 8 analysed “Delta Dairy S.A”. 
(Easton & Dritsas, 1992). The cases were 9 pages, 19 pages, 13 pages and 11 
pages long, respectively. 
The expert component of the study involved two sets of experts, those 
who were attending the Copenhagen workshop and those who were attending 
the Cranfield workshop. The Cranfield experts analysed two cases, 
“Holmesafe Ltd” (Andrews, 2000) and “East Midlands Bus and Coach 
Services Ltd” (Williamson, 2000), and the Copenhagen experts analysed three 
cases, “Graham Stewart: General Manager, A, B and C” (Erskine & Simons, 
2002), “The Purchasing Co-Op” (Menor, Erskine, & Leenders, 2000), and 
“Jim Olson” (Leenders, 2000). All experts worked in small groups of three to 
five people during their initial analyses of these cases. 
Procedure 
The case-analysis sessions were conducted with novices at Lancaster 
University, UK, and with experts during two workshops held by the European 
Case Clearing House. One workshop took place at Cranfield University, UK 
and the other in the Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. These workshops 
were attended by participants from higher education establishments around the 
world and were conducted in English.   
Cases were distributed to the participants before the analysis sessions 
so that they were familiar with the material before discussing it. Participants 
analysed the cases in two different settings: initial, small group discussions 
which lasted between 30 min and 2 hr, and subsequent large group discussions 
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which lasted for approximately 1 hr (with the exception that two expert 
analyses involved only large group discussions). The large group discussions 
were chaired by a case leader, who kept order, wrote down points and invited 
contributions. Small groups were self-directed by the group members. The 
small group discussions allowed the participants a chance to discuss the cases 
in order to prepare for the large group discussion. The novices were allocated 
into collaborating groups of four on the basis of who the module director 
believed would work well together and the experts worked in self-determined 
groups of three to five individuals. 
The aim of the case analyses was for groups to design a package of 
recommendations that could be implemented by one of the organisations 
described within the case.3 The recommendations consisted of the group’s 
analysis of the organisation’s problems and their solutions to those problems. 
At the beginning of the analysis sessions the experimenter introduced himself 
and requested permission to audio-tape the sessions. During the case-analysis 
sessions the experimenter was a passive observer who sat quietly making 
notes. An audio recording was made of the small and large group discussions. 
Analogy Extraction and Coding 
Analogy extraction. Clement (1988) proposed four desirable attributes 
of a definition for recognising spontaneous analogies in participants’ problem-
solving discourse: (1) inclusion of attempts to produce episodes that are 
similar to, but different from, the target problem situation; (2) inclusion of 
such attempts, whether or not they ultimately yield an answer to the problem; 
(3) separation of analogy generation from “other” problem-solving processes; 
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and (4) ruling-out of trivial cases that involve only surface similarity (i.e., 
mere-appearance matches) without relational similarity. 
 Following Clement’s (1988) first three principles we likewise defined 
an analogical episode as having occurred when a participant drew a 
comparison between the existing situation and a previous situation, and it 
could be seen that some aspects of the two situations were equivalent. We 
discounted analogies that: (a) were based on lectures or course materials, (b) 
were drawn by the Case Leader, or (c) were repetitions of previous analogies 
(except where the repetition was drawn to solve a different problem, or the 
function of the analogy changed; in these rare cases the analogies were 
counted as two distinct analogical episodes). Unlike Clement (1988), mere-
appearance matches in the absence of any relational similarity were included 
in our analogy-extraction process, as we believed that analogies arising at this 
level could engender important insights about expert/novice differences in 
domain-based problem solving. Indeed, mere-appearance matches may well 
involve quite rich, and potentially useful, cross-domain correspondences that 
could progress problem solving. Such mappings, therefore, seem worthy of 
analysis. 
 Full analogy extraction was conducted by the first author, and a 15% 
random sample of the data was then analysed by an independent researcher. 
There was 95% agreement between the initial and subsequent analogy 
extraction in this reliability analysis, and disagreements that occurred showed 
no discernable pattern. 
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Coding of analogy structure. Table 1 shows an analogy that was 
produced by a novice during a tutorial, and will serve as the basis of the 
following exemplification of our coding system. The verbal extract in Table 1 
indicates that the participant was tackling the problem of how to achieve 
increased revenue for a petrol-retail company by proposing the solution of 
selling advertising space close to the pumps. This was based on an analogy to 
what other petrol stations were doing. In our formulation of the propositional 
structure of an extracted analogical episode it was necessary: (1) to reduce the 
amount of information in the episode to its core, explicit, ideational and 
relational constructs; and (2) to draw the minimal inferences necessary to 
capture missing relational constructs that were sometimes omitted in the 
analogical episode. Inferences to complete analogies were made infrequently, 
and only when they seemed logically warranted. In the extract in Table 1, for 
example, it was not explicitly stated in the text that “companies are selling 
advertising space”,  but this inference was a minimal necessary inference to 
lend coherence to the analogical episode, and also seemed entirely legitimate  
in the context of the analogy, as giving the advertising space away for free 
would conflict with the stated company aim of increasing revenue.  
 (Table 1 about here) 
Once we had identified the propositional structure of an analogical 
episode in the way that we have just outlined we were then able to apply our 
dichotomous coding scheme to note whether the analogy was either an 
“object-and-attribute mapping” or a “relational mapping”. The analogical 
episode in Table 1 presents an example of the mapping of a higher-order 
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relation, in this case ‘CAUSE’, and therefore it is an example of a relational 
analogy. Holyoak and Thagard (1995) identify a number of different potential 
higher-order relationships, including CAUSE, EXPLAIN, IMPLY, ENTAIL, 
PRESUPPOSE, FACILITATE, HINDER and PREVENT, although CAUSE is 
argued by them to be the most common, and, indeed, it was predominant in 
our own coding of higher-order relations within analogical episodes. 
The coding formalism used here is highly similar to the propositional 
coding of analogies employed by Blanchette and Dunbar (2000) that involved 
variables, relational terms and logical connectives (e.g., and, if…then and 
therefore). We present an example of Blanchette and Dunbar’s (2000) coding 
in Table 2 in order to illustrate their analysis approach. Our analogy example 
presented in Table 1 could readily be reworked into Blanchette and Dunbar’s 
scheme by rephrasing what we include as object names into variables. The 
example would then read “If X sells Y, then this causes X to increase Z”,  in 
other words “If a company sells advertising space near the petrol pumps, then 
this causes the company to increase its revenue”. Critically for our structure-
based analysis of analogies, both Blanchette and Dunbar’s scheme and our 
own Gentner-based scheme would characterise this example analogy as 
involving a relational mapping.  
(Table 2 about here) 
Coding of analogy function. In addition to coding analogies in terms of 
their structure, we also conducted a thematic analysis of analogies aimed at 
identifying the purpose or function for which they were drawn. This thematic 
analysis was undertaken on the original verbal extracts and was independent 
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of our coding of their structure. The way that we applied thematic analysis 
was to sort all identified analogical extracts systematically into distinct 
categories that reflected their identifiable, function-oriented similarities. We 
explored different ways of sorting the analogical extracts based on different 
ways in which their function could be viewed as similar. This was done until a 
coherent scheme was produced that accounted for the data (i.e., there were no 
episodes that remained uncategorized).   
Results 
 An attempt was made in this study to observe real-world analogical 
problem solving in as natural a setting as possible, hence the reliance on 
ethnographic methods and the use of participants who were analysing business 
cases for a purpose outside of the requirements of the study. The use of these 
kinds of participants precluded the exertion of rigid control over the study 
procedures applied and the case-analysis problems examined across our 
expertise manipulation. However, it should be noted that whilst subtle 
discrepancies in both procedures and tasks would make the interpretation of 
any differences in observed expert and novice behaviours quite difficult, such 
discrepancies in procedures and tasks would arguably make the finding of 
expert/novice similarities more robust, since such similarities would have 
arisen despite procedural and task discrepancies. 
Analogy Extraction 
The expert groups produced 34 analogies in 6 hr of discussion, a mean 
rate of 5.6 analogies per hr (SD = 3.8, range = 0-12), whilst the novice groups 
produced 48 analogies in 19 hr of discussion, a mean rate of 2.5 analogies per 
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hr (SD = 4.8, range = 0-20). In addition to these analogy extracts a number of 
other extracts could be identified in which a base was articulated but where 
the target was not clearly identified in the surrounding discourse, although 
often the target could be inferred from earlier discussions or later solutions. 
Thirty-eight instances of this type of extract were produced by the novice 
groups, and five by the expert groups. These extracts were excluded from the 
analysis for reasons of conservatism as well as to maintain correspondence 
with Clement’s (1988) analogy-extraction scheme. Therefore, only extracts 
that directly encompassed a base and a target were considered in subsequent 
analyses. 
The Structure of Novice and Expert Analogies 
Only one analogy drawn by the expert groups, and two by the novice 
groups, involved similarity at only the relational level without there 
additionally being a degree of superficial similarity at the level of object-and-
attribute mappings (see Table 3 for an example of such a “pure” analogy). 
Thus the majority of analogies that were made by our participants were what 
Gentner (1983) would classify as being literal similarities.  
(Table 3 about here) 
In terms of the structure of the analogical mappings that were drawn, 
the majority of analogies generated by both novice groups (i.e., 35 or 73%), 
χ2(1) = 10.08, p = .001, and by expert groups (i.e., 25 or 73%), χ2(1) = 7.53, p 
= .006, were classified as involving relational mappings (see the right-most 
columns of Tables 4 and 5).   
(Tables 4 and 5 about here) 
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The complexity of the higher-order mappings was examined further in 
terms of whether or not the mapping involved a nested arrangement of higher-
order mappings. It was found that only 34% of the novice groups’ higher-
order relational mappings were nested, compared with 60% of the expert 
groups’. Table 6 depicts a nested analogy that was generated by an expert. 
This analogy expresses the idea that one person could get some repayment 
back from another person (who had apparently stolen from them) by forcing 
the purported thief to transfer property to them. This analogy was based on the 
previous experience of the participant, where one company had obtained a 
financial return from another company by forcing that company to transfer 
their customer contracts. 
(Table 6 about here) 
The Function of Novice and Expert Analogies 
The thematic analysis of analogy function resulted in the emergence of 
two principal categories that we labelled as problem solving and illustration. 
The analogies shown in Table 1 and Table 6 are examples of base-to-target 
mappings that served the function of solving a problem. For example, the 
purpose of the analogy in Table 1 was to solve the problem of increasing a 
company’s revenue, whilst the analogy depicted in Table 6 was directed 
toward solving the problem of a company needing to recover money. In 
contrast, analogies that were drawn for the purpose of illustration were 
designed not to facilitate directly the generation or development of a new 
solution idea, but instead for the purpose of exemplifying an existing idea. 
Such analogies, therefore, appeared to be illustrative in nature and intent, 
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rather than directed at problem solving per se. In such cases, the participant 
generated a base situation in order to explicate the target. In Table 3, for 
example, a member of the case-analysis group drew parallels between the 
market positions of Coca Cola and Pepsi to illustrate the position faced by an 
oil company that was currently under consideration in the case analysis. This 
comparison seemed to be drawn purely for the purpose of exemplification. 
 Tables 4 and 5 show the overall frequency of analogies drawn by 
novice groups and expert groups, respectively, for the purposes of problem 
solving versus illustration. Just over one-third of analogies drawn by both 
novice groups (i.e., 18 or 39%) and expert groups (i.e., 13 or 38%) could be 
classified as illustrative. Although problem-solving analogies tended to 
dominate the analogical reasoning of our participants, statistical analyses 
revealed no reliable differences in frequencies: χ2(1) = 3, p = .083, for 
novices; χ2(1) = 1.88, p = .17, for experts.  
 We further sub-divided the problem-solving category into direct 
base-to-target mappings and elaborated base-to-target mappings. Direct base-
to-target mappings were generally of the form of “X did Y, therefore we can 
copy X, and also do Y”. As such, direct base-to-target mappings involved the 
use of an existing idea with little or no modification. In contrast, elaborated 
base-to-target mappings occurred when the information gained from a base 
analogy was used to help formulate a target solution that entailed more than 
simply a wholesale base-to-target mapping. In Table 7, for example, a case-
analysis group was discussing the pricing strategy for a new brand of one-
press champagne. The group used the price of Moët et Chandon as a 
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comparison to the new brand, but in order to convey the uniqueness (and 
therefore desirability) of the new brand they proposed increasing its price 
beyond that of Moët et Chandon. Rather than just simply mapping over the 
price of an analogous brand, therefore, the pricing solution was instead 
tailored to fit the properties of the new brand that the group wanted to convey. 
(Table 7 about here) 
 Our more refined analysis of problem-solving analogies at the level 
of direct base-to-target mappings versus elaborated base-to-target mappings 
revealed that 13 (43%) of the analogies drawn by novice groups, and 9 (43%) 
of those drawn by expert groups, were of the elaborated kind rather than the 
direct kind. Thus both forms of problem-solving analogies were fairly evenly 
distributed in novice and expert case-analysis behaviour. 
 A reliability check was undertaken that involved a second sorter 
independently producing a second thematic analysis of all novice and expert 
analogies, both in terms of the problem solving versus illustration 
categorisation, and also in terms of the more detailed classification of 
problem-solving analogies as being elaborated or direct. The two thematic 
analyses were compared and a difference was scored if an extract had been 
placed in a different position in the two analyses. Consistency between the 
two coders was high, at 87% (i.e., only 7 out of 55 extracts were placed 
differently).  
The Structure and Function of Analogies Compared 
Tables 4 and 5 also present the frequency of analogies serving the 
purpose of problem solving versus illustration that arose when participants 
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either generated object-and-attribute mappings or relational mappings. This 
breakdown of analogies allows a comparison to be made of the association 
between functional aspects of analogising and the structure of the mapping 
process across levels of expertise. A maximum likelihood chi-square test 
(Bishop, Fienberg, & Holland, 1975) exploring the structure by function 
interaction (collapsed across level of expertise) revealed a significant 
difference between observed and expected frequencies of analogy production, 
G2(2) = 31.17, p < .0001. Looking at problem-solving analogies first, it is 
evident that participants invoked analogies that primarily involved relational 
mappings (exclusively so in the novice case), χ2(1) = 39.7, p < .0001. In 
contrast, when analogies were drawn for the purpose of illustration, novices 
were more likely to use object-and-attribute mappings than relational 
mappings, a difference that was marginally significant, χ2(1) = 3.55, p = .059, 
whereas experts showed no preference in the mappings that were employed, 
χ2(1) = .077, p = .78. 
Discussion 
Our study of novice and expert case analysis in a management context 
has produced a number of findings that clarify the nature and role of 
analogical reasoning in real-world problem solving. First, we have 
demonstrated that novices working in groups are able to use analogies 
spontaneously to progress problem solving in a similar manner to that 
previously observed in experts (e.g., Clement, 1988; Dunbar, 2001; Dunbar & 
Blanchette, 2001; Marchant et al., 1993). Second, we have observed no major 
differences between novice and expert groups in the extent to which generated 
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analogies are structured around relational mappings compared with those that 
are structured around purely object-and-attribute mappings. In general, both 
novice and expert analogising was dominated by analogies that mapped 
relational structures between base and target domains. This finding 
demonstrates a sophistication in the application of knowledge that is not 
usually associated with novices (though see Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000). 
Third, we have found that the analogies that both expert and novices groups 
drew were directed toward the attainment of two main practical goals: 
problem solving and illustration.  
The latter observation -- that analogies serve different functions -- is in 
line with Dunbar’s (2001) proposal that analogies may be drawn for different 
purposes in applied contexts (see also Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001). Moreover, 
our results also support Dunbar’s (2001) claim that the structure of 
participants’ analogical mapping may change, depending on the function of 
the mapping. Thus, we saw that problem-solving analogies were dominated by 
relational mappings, whereas illustrative analogies were dominated by pure 
object-and-attribute mappings. We note, though, that this cross-over pattern 
was more marked in the analogical reasoning of novices than experts, and 
may, therefore, need to be interpreted with a degree of caution. In general, 
however, it is clear that the low level of object-and-attribute mappings that 
arose for both experts and novices when an analogy was designed to solve a 
problem attests to the importance of relational associations between base and 
target situations for facilitating effective problem solving. The fact that 
analogies that were aimed at illustration often involved pure object-and-
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attribute mappings without relational mappings is intriguing. It may well be  
that illustrating an idea can frequently be achieved simply and effectively via 
a low-order correspondence between quite superficial elements of the base and 
target situations.                              
In terms of methodological aspects of our research, we note that the 
usual method of constructing an experiment is to have two groups who are 
similar in as many ways as possible except for the variables of interest (the 
independent variables). In real-world situations of the type that pertained in 
the present study, it is not always possible to create experiments with such 
tight control over variables. In particular, the practicalities of doing research 
in real-world domains means that the settings in which research data are 
collected are often less than ideal. Owing to the difficulty of collecting data in 
the present study, we admit to being unable to exert as rigorous a level of 
control as we would have liked over the way that our participants analysed 
their given cases -- or, indeed, the cases that they were presented with. As we 
noted earlier, however, whilst such confounds in the nature of tasks and 
procedures might arguably have invalidated any examination of key 
differences between our two groups, we contend that it makes our findings of 
marked similarities more compelling since such similarities have arisen in 
spite of differences in tasks and procedures. At a methodological level, too, 
we are aware that whilst our novices certainly had considerably less domain 
knowledge that our experts, our ability to polarise our novice and expert 
participants into those with complete domain naïvety versus those with full-
blown domain expertise was imperfect. Nevertheless, we believe that our 
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results remain a valid examination of analogical reasoning in management 
individuals with very different levels of domain knowledge along the expertise 
continuum. 
Overall, then, our results suggest that unprompted analogising may 
well be a generic problem-solving strategy that novices, like experts, are able 
to deploy (cf. Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). We propose, 
however, that contextual factors arsing from the use of meaningful, real-world 
tasks may be critical for observing such spontaneous analogising in novices. 
In management domains, for example, individuals are able to draw on a wide 
range of personal and everyday experience that provides valuable background  
knowledge that can fuel analogy-based reasoning. Thus, whilst our 
management novices were a long way off from being true domain experts, the 
sheer richness of their everyday experience may have enabled them to utilise 
knowledge in similar ways to how experts employ their more specialist 
domain-based knowledge. It seems clear that some real-world domains would 
allow individuals to draw more fully on everyday knowledge than others. For 
example, business management,  political science, and creative design are all 
domains where a rich backdrop of non-specialist knowledge can be applied to 
progress solutions to problems. The extent to which the observation of 
spontaneous analogical reasoning generalises across a range of applied 
domains is an issue that needs further empirical examination.  
As a final point, we note that the vast majority of the analogies that 
were drawn by both novices and experts were what Gentner (e.g., 1983; see 
also Gentner & Markman, 1997) would term literal similarities rather than 
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pure analogies, as they involved a mixture of both object-and-attribute and 
relational mappings. This observation is consistent with research that has 
found that the search for an analogy is often based on superficial features of 
the target information (e.g., Gentner, Ratterman, & Forbus, 1993). The result 
would also be predicted by the MAC/FAC model of analogy proposed by 
Forbus, Gentner, and Law (1995), who argue that the search for potential 
analogies is based on superficial problem features, with the deeper-level 
structure of the base and target predominantly influencing the mapping stage. 
Although we agree that superficial similarities between base and target 
situations are likely to be very important in the search process, other evidence 
indicates that structural similarity may also play a role in the search for a base 
analogue (cf. Wharton, Holyoak, Downing, Lange, Wickens, & Melz, 1994). 
Indeed, in the ARCS model of analogical retrieval proposed by Thagard, 
Holyoak, Nelson, and Gochfield (1990), structural aspects of the target can 
influence the search process. 
 We conclude by noting an important qualification to our results, 
which is that our research, because of its very focus on spontaneous, real-
world analogising, is quite distinct from the majority of analogical problem-
solving research, with its laboratory-based emphasis. Indeed, our study differs 
from the conventional research approach in at least three key respects. First, 
analogies in our study could be drawn from any area of a participant's 
experience; the experimenter did not provide the base information. Second, 
participants solved the problems in groups rather than individually. Third, the 
participants had extended periods of discussion-based activity that was geared 
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toward analysing and solving the presented problem. It is clear that our 
method of exploring analogising represents a very different paradigm to the 
standard experimental approach, such that direct comparisons between the two 
should be drawn with caution. However, considering that experiments on 
analogy are themselves supposed to be analogues of real-world situations 
(though in a more controlled and scaled-down form), a reconsideration of how 
analogical problem solving can fruitfully be investigated experimentally may 
need to be undertaken. This is especially so in the light of mounting evidence 
that both novices and experts can frequently and spontaneously make good 
use of sophisticated analogies in their real-world problem solving. 
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Footnotes 
 1Some of our following examples of predicate structures and 
analogical mappings are derived from those presented in Holyoak and 
Thagard (1995).  
 2 It should be apparent that higher-order argument structures can 
contain nested relations of potentially considerable complexity.  
 3 Most of the cases referred to in the paper are available from the 
European Case Clearing House at http://www.ecch.cranfield.ac.uk 
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Table 1  
An Analogy Produced During a Novice Group’s First Session when Focusing 
on the “Petrol Retailing in Europe” Case 
Analogy produced 
Participant 1: “They’ve got adverts. That’s a possible suggestion -- the 
advertising just getting increased revenue -- is to get advertising spots by 
the pumps. A lot of stations are doing that, and they even have now TV 
screens so you get other companies advertising at your petrol station. It 
might be an idea to increase revenue”. 
Propositional structure of the analogy 
Base:  CAUSE [SELLS (Company-X, Advertising-Space-Near-Petrol-
Pumps), INCREASE (Company-X, Revenue)] 
 
Target: CAUSE [SELLS (Company-A, Advertising-Space-Near-Petrol-
Pumps), INCREASE (Company-A, Revenue)] 
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Table 2 
An Example of the Structure of an Analogy Created by Blanchette and Dunbar 
(2000) by Substituting Variables for Object Names (see Blanchette & Dunbar, 
2000, p.112, Table 2) 
 
Analogy produced 
Social programs are needed 
If social programs are cut  
Then negative consequence 
Therefore, don’t cut social programs 
 
Propositional structure of the analogy 
X is needed 
If X is eliminated  
Then negative consequence 
Therefore, don’t eliminate X 
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Table 3 
A “Pure” Analogy Produced During a Novice Group’s Second Session when 
Focusing on the “Petrol Retailing in Europe” Case 
Analogy produced 
Participant 1: “You know, you said the other day that Coca Cola and Pepsi 
are within an arm’s reach -- there's not much of a differentiation. It's the 
same here”.   
Propositional structure of the analogy 
Base: CLOSE-MARKET-POSITION (Coca-Cola, Pepsi) 
 
Target: CLOSE-MARKET-POSITION (Petrol-Station-X, Petrol-Station-
Y) 
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Table 4 
Frequency of Analogies Produced by Novices, Categorised by their Structure 
and Function 
                           Function  
Structure Illustration Problem Solving Total 
Object-and-Attribute Mappings 13 0 13 
Relational Mappings 5 30 35 
Total 18 30 48 
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Table 5 
Frequency of Analogies Produced by Experts, Categorised by their Structure 
and Function 
                           Function  
Structure Illustration Problem Solving Total 
Object-and-Attribute Mappings 6 3 9 
Relational Mappings 7 18 25 
Total 13 21 34 
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Table 6 
An Analogy Produced by an Expert (Copenhagen Study, Large Group 
Discussion) when Focusing on the “Graham Stewart: General Manager, A, B 
And C” Case 
Analogy produced 
Participant 1: “He’s been foolish not to check. He’s to try to get as much 
money as he can. Bring muscle along, almost illegally”. 
Participant 2: “He’s already undermining us. Get him to sign the property 
over to us. It’s an option but it needs a lot of muscle”. 
Participant 1: “We had a similar situation when a major customer closed 
down. We got him to sign over the contracts so we were paid by the 
customers”. 
Propositional structure of the analogy 
Base: CAUSE [GET (Company-X, Money-From-Debtor), CAUSE [FORCE 
(Company-X, Debtor), TRANSFER-CONTRACTS (Debtor, Company-X)] ] 
 
Target: CAUSE [GET (Person-A, Money-From-Debtor), CAUSE 
[FORCE (Person-A, Debtor), TRANSFER-PROPERTY (Debtor, Person-
A)] ] 
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Table 7 
An Example from a Novice Group’s Second Session of a Participant 
Producing an Elaboration of a Basic Mapping when Focusing on the 
“Champagne Industry In 1993” Case 
Analogy produced 
Participant 1: “Another thing that we were having difficulty coming up with 
is an actual price, because we were thinking, ‘Shall we out-price Moët et 
Chandon by only a small amount, because it gives that exclusivity, and we 
didn't want to go for exactly the same price because we've got this unique 
selling point?’ So if you just did it a tiny bit more expensive, going to that bit 
much it's as good as and it's got this unique selling point, and it's only a tiny 
bit more so that it's not too much of a stretch to buy it over Moët et Chandon. 
So people realise that it must be better, because it's that bit more expensive, 
and it's got this unique selling point”. 
Propositional structure of the basic analogy prior to its elaboration 
Base: ENABLE [AS-INDEXED-BY (Product-Quality-And-Exclusivity, 
High-Price), IMPLEMENT (Moët-et-Chandon, Marketing-Strategy] ] 
 
Target: ENABLE [AS-INDEXED-BY (Product-Quality-And-Exclusivity, 
High-Price), IMPLEMENT (Company-Y, Marketing-Strategy] ] 
Propositional structure of the elaborated solution 
CAUSE [MORE-EXPENSIVE-THAN (Company-Y-Champagne, Moët-et-
Chandon-Champagne), MARKET-ADVANTAGE-OVER (Company-Y, 
Moët-et-Chandon)] 
 
 
